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Non-technical summary 
In this paper, wage and productivity effects of continuing training are estimated and compared 
in order to analyse who gains from workers' training. Investments in continuing training are 
undertaken in order to raise the level of qualification in a firm and to secure its economic 
performance. Whether these investments in training are profitable to the individual, the firm 
and society as a whole is still unclear although the question is of considerable importance. 
Most studies on the productivity impact of training take wages as a proxy for productivity. 
The focus of this paper is on comparing wage and productivity effects in order to study how 
the training rent is shared between employers and employees. The use of system GMM 
techniques allows me to account for endogeneity and time invariant unobserved factors. 
In more detail, wage and productivity effects are estimated and compared using panel data on 
the industry level in order to analyse the extent to which employer and employees gain from 
continuing training. This empirical analysis at the sectoral level suggests that the rent sharing 
aspect of training is important for employer and employees in Germany. Results show that 
both employer and employees profit from the investment in human capital. The estimated 
productivity effects of training are higher, on average, than the wage effects. 
Since the estimated effect of continuing training on productivity exceeds the effects estimated 
by comparable studies using firm level data, my results hint to the existence of external 
effects of training on a sector level, that is, spillovers from training between firms in the same 
sector. 
The results of former work suggest that skill group heterogeneity of the training impact on 
wages should be considered. In order to shed light on this issue and to analyse whether the 
impacts of participating in training on wages and on productivity differ for low and highly 
skilled workers, I differentiate between these two groups. This extension enables me to 
analyse whether there are spillovers between the two skill groups. I test whether training 
participation of high skilled has an influence on wages of low skilled or the other way around. 
High skilled workers seem to capture a larger share of the rent than low skilled workers. This 
result is consistent with former work. In addition, I do not find positive external effects of 
firm-provided training between skill groups. 
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Abstract
Wage and productivity effects of training are compared to study how the
training rent is shared between employers and employees. With panel data
from 1996-2002, I analyse the impact of continuing training on wages and
productivity in a Cobb-Douglas production framework. Using system GMM
techniques allows me to account for endogeneity and time invariant unob-
served factors. Results suggest that the training rent is shared between em-
ployer and employee due to a positive effect of continuing training on both
wages and productivity. The effect on productivity is about three times higher
than the one on wages. High skilled workers capture a larger share of the rent
than low skilled workers.
Keywords: continuing vocational training, system GMM estimation, wage ef-
fect, productivity effect, external effect
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1 Introduction
Investments in continuing training are undertaken in order to raise the level
of qualification in a firm and to secure its economic performance. There are
also arguments for subsidising continuing training which relate to the society’s
perceived social and economic benefits from such investments which ought to
boost productivity and growth. The main arguments are positive external
effects of continuing training which induce welfare gains and technological
progress. Whether these investments in training are profitable to the indi-
vidual, the firm and society as a whole is still of considerable importance.
While most studies for Germany take wages as a proxy for productivity and
find a positive effect of training on productivity, the impact is ambiguous in
the few studies using direct measures of productivity. Also, in recent work on
training effects on wages where panel data and advanced econometric meth-
ods are used, the positive effect of training vanishes (for Germany, see Ju¨rges
and Schneider, 2005; Kuckulenz and Maier, 2006).
Human capital externalities play a prominent role in recent growth theory
(Barro, 2001). In empirical work with individual data some recent studies
try to estimate the externality caused by education (for example, Ciccone
and Peri, 2002; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000). While investment in continu-
ing training is alleged to give rise to spillover benefits, empirical support for
the existence of such positive external effects is scarce and weak, however.
Recently, Martins (2005) reports large firm-level social returns from on-the-
job training accruing from spillovers that benefit less educated workers. No
statistically significant effect of education on earnings is found by Isaacsson
(2005). In addition, knowledge about how the rent resulting from invest-
ment in training is shared between employer and employee is scarce (see, for
example, Booth, Francesconi and Zoega, 2003; Dearden, Reed, van Reenen,
2005).
In this paper, both wage and productivity effects are estimated and compared
with panel data on the industry level in order to analyse who gains from
investment in training. To the best of my knowledge, it is shown for the first
time with German data that the rent sharing aspect between employer and
employees is important for company provided training. Results show that
employer and employees both profit from the investment in human capital.
The estimated productivity effects of training are higher than the wage effect.
In addition, the results hint to the existence of positive external effects from
training on productivity. Comparing the estimated coefficients to the results
of comparable studies using firm data, I find evidence for knowledge spillovers
between firms in the same sector. Previous work has shown that the training
impact on wages differs for low and high skilled workers (e.g., Kuckulenz
and Zwick, 2003). In order to shed light on this issue and analyse whether
the impacts of participating in training on wages and on productivity differ
between low and high skilled workers, I differentiate between these two groups.
This extension enables me to analyse whether there are spillovers between the
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two skill groups.
I will proceed as follows: Section 2 discusses the results from previous lit-
erature. Section 3 explains how the data set is set together and Section 4
presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 describes the estimation strat-
egy. Section 6 discusses the results for the basic model and Section 7 for the
extension where I differentiate between low and high skilled workers. Section
8 summarises and concludes.
2 Background Discussion
Wages, profits and rent-sharing have been a topic for macroeconomists as
well as for labour economists (for example, Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey,
1996; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1993). Empirical evidence has shown that
when firms become more prosperous, workers eventually receive some of the
gains (Hildreth and Oswald, 1997; Arai, 2003; Estevao and Tevlin, 2003).
The central prediction of noncompetitive theories is also that rents are di-
vided between firms and employees (e.g. Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004). In a
randomised field experiment, Fehr and Go¨tte (2004) show that workers are
willing to supply more labour when their wage increases. This is not in line
with standard life cycle models but can be explained by preference spillovers
across periods and reciprocate behaviour. Only few theoretical and empirical
work has focused on the relationship between training investments and rent
sharing. Booth and Zoega (1999) show that turnover in a company comprises
a negative externality. By causing the firms’ discount rate to exceed the so-
cial discount rate, high turnover thus leads to an underinvestment in training.
Burdett and Smith (2002) find within a matching model that rent sharing di-
minishes the worker’s incentive to acquire skills but the subsequent improved
matching prospects may offset the initial disincentive to invest. McLaughlin
(1994) and Piekkola and Kauhanen (2003) show that highly educated workers
are the main target of rent sharing. Thus, it is important to take heterogeneity
of the workforce into account.
If there is a positive productivity effect of training, there is a rent to share and
either wages should increase, or firms value added per worker, or both. How
the rent is shared between employer and employee may depend on several
aspects. First, the productivity increase from training can be divergent for
different training forms and can differ for heterogenous participants. Thus,
it can influence how the training rent is shared. Second, the rent sharing
obviously depends on who pays for training. Third, whether an employee
profits from training or not may also be influenced by the respective bar-
gaining power of the worker and the firm. Former evidence suggests that it is
likely that workers have less bargaining power (ceteris paribus) if they are less
qualified, if they work for a large firm, when they just entered a firm or when
they are on a fixed term contract. Firms are likely to have less bargaining
power (ceteris paribus) when few workers with comparable human capital are
available, when workers are not restricted in their mobility, or when demand
for workers is much higher than supply in a labour market (Kuckulenz and
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Zwick, 2003).
Former empirical evidence on productivity effects of training is rather mixed
(compare, for example, Blundell, Dearden, Meghir and Sianesi, 1999; Dear-
den, Reed, and van Reenen, 2000; Zwick, 2005). An important part of this
heterogeneity might be due to the varying methodological strategies. Cross-
section estimations might be biased because some explanatory variables, like
capital and labour, are endogenous (Griliches and Mairesse, 1998 or Boon
and Van der Eijken, 1997) and unobserved time invariant factors, such as
technological change in economic sectors, which can be correlated with both,
training and productivity, cannot be accounted for. Unless I control for these
fixed effects, I may overestimate the importance of training for productivity.
I use panel estimation methods, which eliminate unobserved time invariant
heterogeneity. Some studies have pointed to the endogeneity of training: the
decision to invest in training is likely to depend on firm’s performance. Em-
pirical studies show that less productive firms tend to invest more in training
(see Dearden, Reed, and van Reenen, 2000; Zwick, 2002). It is likely that firms
may reallocate idle labour to training activities when they face a downturn in
demand in their industry. Therefore, it is crucial to control for endogeneity
of continuing training because otherwise the true productivity contributions
of training will be understated.
Recently, comparisons of wage and productivity effects of training were made
in empirical papers (Bartel, 1995; Rennison and Turcotte, 2004; Lopez-Acevedo,
2003; Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen, 2000). In these studies, the effect of
training on both wages and productivity is computed, which allows to esti-
mate the shares accrued to the firm and to the worker, respectively. Bartel
(1995) uses performance scores as an indicator for productivity and finds a
positive impact of training on wage growth as well as on productivity. Using
Spanish firm-level data, Alba-Ramirez (1994) finds a positive correlation be-
tween training investments and productivity as well as with wages. Dearden,
Reed and Van Reenen (2000) estimate a positive effect of training on pro-
ductivity with a British panel of aggregated data (on industry level) and find
that the impact is underestimated when taking wages as a proxy. In studies
with Canadian and Mexican linked employer employee data, this result is con-
firmed. Lopez-Acevedo (2003) shows with Mexican linked employer-employee
data that both employer and employees benefit from investments in train-
ing. Likewise, Rennison and Turcotte (2004) estimate with Canadian data a
positive impact of (computer) training on wages and productivity controlling
for various firm and worker characteristics. Also in this study, training has a
larger impact on productivity than on wages, hinting at the sharing of costs
and returns to training, as suggested by Becker (1964). Ballot, Fakhfakh and
Taymaz (2001) use panels of French and Swedish firms to explore whether
firms or workers benefit from training. They find that although the employ-
ees obtain significant benefits, firms obtain the largest part of the training
rent. The authors conclude that firms can rationally invest in training and
that hence, the hold-up problem leading to underinvestment in training by
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firms may be less severe than suggested by theoretical work (MacLeod and
Malcomson, 1993).
Regarding the literature on German data, no study seems to concentrate on
the training impact on productivity and wages simultaneously and to ex-
plore the issue of rent sharing. Closest to this analysis is Hempell (2003),
where investments in information and communication technologies and firm-
sponsored training programmes are analysed. Using panel data from German
service companies for the period 1994-1998, the impact of these investments
on firm productivity is explored and compared to the impact on wage costs.
I am not aware of any work where training is distinguished for low and high
skilled workers to analyse whether there are differences in the impacts of
training on wages and on productivity between skill groups. In the extension
I explore whether there are differences for low and high skilled workers in
the productivity effect of training and how the rent resulting from training is
shared. Also, I test whether there are externalities of training participation,
specifically spillover effects between skill groups. This is done by estimating
the impact of training high skilled workers on average wages of low-skilled
workers and by estimating the impact of training low-skilled workers on av-
erage wages of high skilled workers. The idea is that workers share their new
knowledge with other workers (for example, high skilled workers teach the
new knowledge to co-workers). Alternatively, high skilled workers might or-
ganise their work better after training. In that case, also low skilled workers
profit from training participation of their team leaders or a foreman.
3 Data Set
Several types of data sets provide the opportunity to analyse wage and pro-
ductivity effects of continuing training. Case studies are a good alternative
if an indicator for workers individual productivity as well as their wage is
available. Bartel (1995) uses data from the personnel record of a company to
estimate the impact of training on wage growth and job performance. The
drawback of this type of study is that it is not representative data and there-
fore, no inference can be made for the population. During the last years linked
employer employee data sets became available for more and more countries.
Here, the individual data set of workers includes a firm number for the em-
ployer. That way it can be identified which workers are employed by the same
firm. Thus, firm specific effects can be controlled for and information about
the firms’ characteristics can be imputed from a firm level data set. Hence,
this type of data set is first best to use when estimating productivity effects
of continuing training.
Dearden, Reed, Van Reenen (2000) have shown, however, that it is also pos-
sible to use data aggregated on the industry level for analysing wage and
productivity effects of continuing training. This approach is also taken here.
The advantage of using aggregate data on the sectoral level is that external
effects of training between firms in the same sector are included. Comparing
the estimated coefficients with results from similar studies that conducted the
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analysis with firm data allows me to estimate the size of these external effects.
I merge information from two sources to construct a panel data set. The
main source is the German Micro-Census, a 1 percent sample of households in
Germany. I aggregate information on the industry level and append industry
data taken from the German National Accounts (NA). The compound panel
data set consists of 58 industrial sectors in the cross section dimension and of
seven years in the time series dimension, 1996 to 2002. In the Micro-Census,
the survey questions on continuing training were completely changed from
1995 to 1996. For this reason I cannot use earlier years. Later years are
not available yet. I use the following variables from the German National
Accounts:
• gross value added,
• gross fixed capital formation,
• number of occupied persons,
• fixed assets as a proxy for capital.
A number of variables from the German Micro-Census are merged to this
panel data set on an industry level. The main variable of interest is continuing
training. In the years 1996 to 1998, two measures are available: participation
in continuing training in the last four weeks and in the last year. The latter
measure is the preferred one, because more employees indicate to participate
in training during last year than during the last four weeks and hence the
expected impact on sector productivity is also higher. Unfortunately, this
measure of continuing training is not available for waves 1999 to 2002, so I have
to choose the second best measure in order to use a longer time series of data.
Hence, the variable of interest is the sectoral share of workers that took part
in continuing training during four weeks prior to the survey. There are two
important advantages of the data set. First, training participation is measured
every year and it is possible to analyse the impact of training not only on
current productivity but also on future productivity. Former work has shown
that continuing training seems to have a lagged impact on productivity and I
will include lagged training indicators in the analysis (see Bartel, 1995; Zwick,
2005). Second, the outcome variable, value added, includes also training
costs. In contrast to many other studies, I can therefore make inferences on
the impact of training on firm profitability. Other variables from the Micro-
Census are:
• average net hourly wage (no information about gross wages) of all work-
ers and separately for low and high skilled,
• average working time per sector,
• share of part-time contracts and share of temporary contracts,
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• qualification (I include the proportion of high skilled, which are those
who have a university (or university of applied sciences) degree),
• enterprise size (I include the proportion of large firms with more than
1000 employees),
• job tenure (I use 7 variables indicating the share of employees per sector
with a certain tenure),
• and, as a proxy for fluctuation in a sector, the proportion of workers
per sector who changed the employer during last year (i.e. sectoral
share of workers that change the job per year). (Expected) worker
mobility determines the decision of firms to provide training and also
that firms lose human capital if workers switch jobs (see, e.g., Garloff
and Kuckulenz, 2006).
Additionally, I include the proportion of women and an indicator for East
Germany to take into account differences in productivity and wages between
east and west Germany (see Falk and Pfeiffer, 1998). The number of obser-
vations is 406 (58 sectors in seven years). For means and standard deviations
of all variables used in the estimations see Table 6 in the appendix.
4 Descriptive Statistics
Participation in training varies between economic sectors, over time and by
personal characteristics. Figure 1 shows participation in training per year. In
the years 1996 to 2002 around 3 percent of the employees took part in training
during four weeks prior to the survey. Training participation decreased in the
late nineties and increased again slightly in 2001 and 2002. The share of
workers that indicate to take part in on the job training (four weeks prior to
the survey) is 5 percent in the British Labour Force Survey, so significantly
higher than in the German Micro-Census (Dearden, Read and van Reenen,
2000).
There is considerably dispersion of training incidence across sectors. The
share of training participants four weeks prior to the survey varies from zero
for some sectors in some years (fishery, leather trade, nutrition trade, recycling
and hotel and restaurant industry) to more than eight percent (data handling
and databases, education and teaching, banking sector and insurance indus-
try). A list of all sectors and the incidence of training, i.e. mean participation
in training by sector, is given in the appendix (Table 7). Personal character-
istics play a major role in determining training participation. Distinguish-
ing between low (without tertiary education) and high skilled (with tertiary
education) employees, it can be noted that the probability to take part in
training is on average about 2.5 times higher for high than for low skilled
workers. Training participation also varies widely by age. Young employees
participate much more than older employees: around 5 percent of employees
below 30 and less than 1 percent of employees above 55 take part in training.
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Figure 1: Average training participation in MZ 1996 - 2002
Source: Micro-Census, own estimation.
Using the median of training participation per sector, I divide the economic
sectors into two groups, those with a high and those with a low incidence of
training. The mean characteristics of these two groups of sectors are given in
Table 1. Evidently, they differ also in other characteristics than the incidence
of training. Economic sectors with a high incidence of training employ a
higher share of high skilled and more women. In addition, firms in these
sectors are larger and more profitable (have a higher value added) than average
and employees have a higher average tenure and are paid a higher wage.
Specifically, I am interested in the correlation between wages and productivity
with training. Figures 2 and 3 show the bivariate relationship of training
and productivity and of training and wages. A clear picture appears for the
relation between training and wages, the correlation is strongly positive. The
relationship between training and productivity is less clear, but the fitted line
is pointing upward, showing a weaker positive relationship. In the following,
I explore the nature of these relationships in more detail.
5 Basic Model
In the basic model I follow Dearden, Reed and van Reenen (2000 and 2005)
and estimate the impact of the sectoral average training participation on
average wage and productivity. In the extension, in contrast, I distinguish
between low and high skilled workers and use average values for each skill
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Table 1: Sector means for low and high training intensive sectors
Variables LOW HIGH
Hourly wage 16.36 20.00
Number employed 9331.96 10435.42
Value added 23.21 43.54
Investments 4.09 11.21
Capital 32.45 35.39
Training 0.02 0.04
Working-hours 38.27 36.51
Part-time 0.17 0.20
Job change 0.11 0.09
Large firms 0.18 0.26
High skilled 0.12 0.33
Women 0.37 0.49
Temporary contract 0.05 0.08
Tenure 0-4 0.39 0.33
Tenure 5-9 0.22 0.21
Tenure 10-14 0.12 0.14
Tenure 15-19 0.07 0.09
Tenure 20-29 0.11 0.14
Tenure 30-39 0.05 0.05
Tenure 40 and above 0.01 0.01
Age17-20 0.02 0.01
Age21-25 0.07 0.07
Age26-30 0.12 0.12
Age31-35 0.16 0.15
Age36-40 0.15 0.16
Age41-50 0.26 0.28
Age51-65 0.22 0.22
Remark: Sectors are divided in two groups of equal size using the median of training
frequency per sector. This table shows the mean characteristics of these two groups.
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Figure 2: Training and productivity
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Remark: Scatterplot of value added per worker and the frequency of training per sector.
group.
5.1 Estimation Strategy
In order to quantify the impact of continuing training on wages and pro-
ductivity, I use a simple Cobb-Douglas production function following Bartel
(1995), Black and Lynch (2001) and Dearden, Reed and van Reenen (2000):
Q = ALαKβ, (1)
where Q is value added, A is a Hicks neutral efficiency parameter, L is effec-
tive labour, and K is capital. Assuming that effective labour improves with
training, effective labour can be written as:
L = NU + γNT , (2)
where NU are untrained and NT are trained workers and hence, the total
number of workers N is N = NU + NT . Trained workers are expected to
be more productive than untrained workers and, hence, γ > 1. Substituting
equation 2 into 1 gives:
Q = A(NU + γNT )αKβ, .
which can be rewritten as
Q = A(1 + (γ − 1)Train)αNαKβ, (3)
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Figure 3: Training and hourly wage
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Remark: Scatterplot of average log wage and the frequency of training per sector.
where Train = N
T
N . If (γ−1)Train is small, the approximation ln(1+x) = x
can be used and the production function can be rewritten in logarithmic form
as:
logQ = logA+ α(γ − 1)Train+ α logN + β logK. (4)
If the industry exhibits constant returns to scale, i.e. α+ β = 1, then (4) can
be written in terms of labour productivity:
log
Q
N
= logA+ (1− β)(γ − 1)Train+ β log K
N
. (5)
In case trained workers are no more productive than untrained, i.e. γ = 1,
the coefficient of Train will be zero. A large number of other variables that
are assumed to have systematic influences on productivity are captured in A.
Notably, I include proxies for human capital (education, age, tenure), working
hours, turnover rate, gender, regional composition, proportion of large firms
and temporary contracts. Additionally, I include year dummies to control for
year fixed effects.
Instrumental variables that are correlated with training but uncorrelated with
productivity or GMM techniques are two commonly used approaches in order
to take endogeneity into account. Since valid external instruments are diffi-
cult to find, I choose recent GMM techniques that exploit information in the
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levels and in difference equations (for an intuitive guide to panel data models,
refer to Bond, 2002; for an application of GMM estimation to production
functions, see Blundell and Bond, 2000). The estimation strategy controls
for observed time invariant sector heterogeneity by using system GMM panel
regressions. It simultaneously controls for endogeneity of continuing training
by using internal instrumental variables. The system GMM estimator pro-
posed by Arellano and Bover (1995) avoids the poor finite sample properties
of the simple within estimator or the simple GMM estimator, which take first
differences to eliminate unobserved firm-specific effects or use lagged internal
instruments to correct for simultaneity in the first-difference equations. It
is problematic to use lagged levels as instruments because they are usually
only weakly correlated with the subsequent first differences of these variables
and therefore have weak explanatory power (Blundell and Bond, 2000). To
overcome this problem, the system GMM estimator uses the lagged first dif-
ferences as instruments for the equations in first differences, assuming that
the internal instruments are correlated with current values but independent
of the error term. As with any valid instrumental variables strategy, this esti-
mator corrects for any bias arising from measurement error in the dependent
variable and the regressors. I report the Hansen test for overidentification
of the model and serial correlation tests since the GMM estimator depends
on the absence of second order serial correlation in the error term (Dearden,
Reed and Van Reenen, 2000). A negative first order correlation, in contrast,
is consistent with the assumptions of the model. Summarising, the system
GMM estimator avoids inconsistencies incurred by unobserved heterogeneity
and simultaneity of the choice of training, capital, labour, wages and output
(Blundell and Bond, 1999; Black and Lynch, 2001; Hempell, 2002; Zwick,
2003; Gu¨rtzgen, 2005). Hence, the resulting basic empirical model for the
logarithm of value added (productivity) per worker yit of sector i in period t
is:
yit = β1Trainit + β3k + β2x+ ηi + ²it,
where k represents the logarithm of capital per worker, x is a vector of explana-
tory variables, ηi denotes time-invariant unobserved sector-specific effects im-
pacting productivity and the error term ²it is assumed to be asymptotically
normally distributed. To account for aggregation bias1, data is weighted by
the number of employed in each economic sector. Similarly, I run wage re-
gressions, where I explain average wage wit in sector i in period t by exactly
the same inputs that enter the production function:
wit = β1Trainit + β3k + β2x+ ηi + ²it.
1I expect that the fixed effects will control for much of the problem of aggregation
biases in industry level data. Also, I take logs of means and not the means of logs when
aggregating. As long as the higher order moments of the distributions are constant over
time in an economic sector, then they will be captured by a fixed effect. If they evolve at
the same rate across industries they will be picked up by time dummies (see also Dearden,
Reed and Van Reenen, 2000).
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With this specification, I can assess and compare the wage and productivity
impact of continuing training to have a first idea how the training rent is
shared between employers and employees.
5.2 Empirical Results
First, I pool the data and estimate productivity and hourly wage regres-
sions with simple static pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) to have a
benchmark result. Results are shown in Table 2. The training coefficient
is significantly positive in the hourly wage regression (second column) and
positive but insignificant in the productivity regression (first column). The
higher R-squared in the second column suggests that the variation in average
hourly wages per sector is better explained by the covariates than the vari-
ation in sectoral productivity. A high share of high skilled and investments
are positively related with productivity and with hourly wages. The share of
women and of firms per sector located in East Germany are negatively related
with hourly wages but not with productivity. There is no significant relation
between age and productivity but the share of young workers is negatively
related with hourly wages. This hints at the existence of seniority wages
(Lazear, 2000). Average tenure in a sector and the indicator for fluctuation
are (weakly) negatively related with wages and not significantly related with
productivity. The share of employees with temporary contracts is higher in
sectors that are less productive and pay lower hourly wages. Labour and
capital are positively related with productivity (although capital is not sig-
nificant in the estimation) and are insignificant in the wage regressions. Firm
size and hourly wages are significantly positively correlated. The productivity
regression shows no significant relation between the share of large firms and
the outcome variable.
In addition, I estimate four different models for the productivity regression
as well as for the hourly wage regression with system GMM.2 In the various
models I vary the number of regressors and the exogeneity assumptions. The
first model is the most restrictive one, assuming endogeneity of capital and
labour and exogeneity of all other variables. The second model assumes en-
dogeneity of capital, labour and training. The third and fourth model are
the least restrictive models, allowing for endogeneity of all regressors except
for the regional indicator and the time dummies. In the second and the
fourth model, I add dummies indicating the share of age groups per sector
as additional regressors. The specific assumptions of the empirical models
are described in the tables together with the results. The system GMM re-
sults of the productivity regression are reported in Table 2 and those of the
hourly wage regression are reported in Table 3. Included in the tables are
also the Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation. AR(1) is expected in first
2Alternatively, I also used the first-difference GMM estimator for the calculations but
I obtained much more reasonable results using the system GMM estimator. Specifically, I
find that the additional instruments used in the system GMM estimator are both valid and
informative in this context.
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Table 2: POLS
variables Productivity regression Hourly wage regression
coef. t-values coef. t-values
Training 2.83 (1.42) 0.79 (1.90)∗
ln capital 0.02 (0.23) -0.02 (-1.28)
ln investments 0.44 (6.22)∗∗∗ 0.04 (3.17)∗∗∗
Large firms 0.56 (0.87) 0.22 (1.96)∗
Temporary contract -4.72 (-3.93)∗∗∗ -0,94 (-4.02)∗∗∗
ln labour 0.07 (2.12)∗∗ 0.00 (-0.60)
Job change -1.00 (-0.64) -0.61 (-2.08)∗∗
High skilled 0.99 (1.89)∗ 0.77 (7.94)∗∗∗
Women -0.07 (-0.19) -0.34 (-6.77)∗∗∗
Tenure 0-4 reference reference
Tenure 5-9 1.29 (1.22) 0.01 (0.03)
Tenure 10-14 0.30 (0.20) -0.35 (-1.30)
Tenure 15-19 1.43 (1.18) 0.30 (1.17)
Tenure 20-29 -1.76 (-0.84) 0.12 (0.54)
Tenure 30-39 -1.37 (-0.55) -0.62 (-1.98)∗
Tenure 40-51 -9.71 (-1.61) -2.39 (-2.77)∗∗∗
Age 17-20 reference reference
Age 21-25 6.23 (0.84) 1.92 (1.83)∗
Age 26-30 1.12 (0.18) 0.71 (0.70)
Age 31-35 2.79 (0.49) 1.31 (1.27)
Age 36-40 0.90 (0.14) 1.25 (1.19)
Age 41-50 -0.12 (-0.02) 1.23 (1.21)
Age 51-65 4.92 (0.74) 1.72 (1.72)∗
Intercept -2.76 (-0.48) 1.95 (2.05)∗∗
Observations 361 364
Sectors 52 52
R-squared 0.8325 0.8989
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
13
differences but higher-order autocorrelation indicates that some lags of the de-
pendent variable, which might be used as instruments, are in fact endogenous,
thus, bad instruments. I also report a test of over-identifying restrictions, i.e.
whether the instruments as a group appear exogenous. For all models, test
statistics show that the models are well specified. I also test with Hansen dif-
ference statistics whether additional moment conditions are fulfilled. Testing
the specification with endogenous capital, labour, and training against the
more restrictive specification where training is exogenous, a low p-value indi-
cates that the training variable is endogenous. In contrast, testing the other
additional regressors for exogoneity, the Hansen difference statistics suggest
that additional moment conditions are fulfilled. Hence, the second model
is the preferred specification but I nevertheless report the results of all four
specifications.
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Table 3 contains the results of the productivity regressions. Like in the pooled
OLS regression, the estimated training coefficient is positive. In the system
GMM regressions, the coefficient of training is, however, significant. Both
contemporaneous training and lagged training have a positive and significant
impact on productivity. That is, those sectors with high participation in con-
tinuing training achieve a higher value added per worker in the year where
training took place and also in the next year. Only in the last model, the
impact of training on productivity is insignificant. The model is probably
overloaded with regressors and instruments. Thus, there remain hardly any
significant coefficients. Capital and labour are positive but not significant in
the regressions. Investments per worker have a positive and significant im-
pact on sectoral productivity and fluctuation proxied by job changes within
a sector as well as the share of temporary contracts have a negative influ-
ence on sector productivity.3 Evidence for average tenure in a sector is mixed
but suggesting that low average tenure per sector has a positive impact on
productivity. Contrasting the results from pooled OLS regressions, the age
dummies are positive and significant in the system GMM regressions. There-
fore, a higher share of older workers per sector seems to have a positive impact
of productivity.
Results from the hourly wage regressions are given in Table 4. Like in the
pooled OLS regression, the estimated training coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant. While in the productivity regression, both contemporaneous and
lagged training have a significant impact on productivity, in the hourly wage
regressions, only contemporaneous training is significant. Investments (lagged
and contemporaneous) have a positive influence on wages similar to the im-
pact of investments on productivity. The impact of capital on wages seems
to be insignificant. Only in Model 3, there is a negative impact of contem-
poraneous capital intensity on wages and a positive impact of lagged capital
intensity on wages. Fluctuation in a sector as well as the share of contem-
porary contracts have a negative influence on hourly wages (again similar to
the results in the productivity regression). The share of high skilled workers
and the share of women do not have any impact on sectoral productivity. In
the wage regressions, these indicators are highly significant in all models. A
large share of high skilled workers is related to high hourly wages and a high
share of women in a sector is related to low average wages in a sector. Again,
the evidence for tenure is rather mixed. As in the productivity regression, the
age variables are positive and significant; i.e. seniority wages are prevalent, a
high share of older workers is related to high average wages in a sector.
As noted by Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000), grouping of data on
the industry level has the advantage that spillovers of continuing training
are included in the productivity effect. For example, if workers with higher
human capital are more likely to generate new ideas and innovations which
may spill to other employees even in other firms (within the industry), micro-
3Sectoral fluctuation includes job changes within the sector and entrees and from other
sectors.
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level estimation underestimates the true impact of continuing training because
externalities to human capital acquisition are not taken into account. In a
non-technical review of the empirical evidence on the returns to education for
the individual, the firm and the economy at large, Blundell, Dearden, Meghir
and Sianesi (1999) note that there exists hardly any empirical evidence on
the returns to training including externalities.
Similar studies with German data using firm level survey data also find posi-
tive effects of training on productivity. Zwick (2004 and 2006) estimates with
similar econometric methods a positive training coefficients close to 1. The
estimated coefficients here are higher and therefore suggest that knowledge
spillovers between firms in the same sector exist. Of course, not the entire
difference in coefficients has to reflect positive externalities. Differences in the
data set used can also explain differences in estimation results as is shown in
Kuckulenz (2006).
6 Differentiation between Low and High Skilled
In an extension of the basic model based on Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen
(2000 and 2005), I allow for worker heterogeneity in the basic production
function. This allows me to estimate the impact of training on productivity
for low and high skilled workers separately. Additionally, I estimate the im-
pact of training on own average wages for both skill groups separately and on
the average wage of the other group. This may hint to the existence of exter-
nalities between workers or, more specifically, between different skill groups.
If, for example, training high skilled employees exhibits a positive external
effect because they transmit the new knowledge to the low skilled employees,
there could be a positive impact of training high skilled workers on wages of
low skilled workers.
6.1 Extension of the Model
For the extension I use the same simple Cobb-Douglas production function:
Q = ALαLL
β
HK
γ . (6)
Here, LL is effective low skilled labour and LH is effective high skilled labour.
Assuming that effective labour is improved by training, it can be written as
LL = NUL + δN
T
L (7)
and
LH = NUH + ²N
T
H , (8)
where NUL are untrained low skilled workers, N
T
L are trained low skilled work-
ers, NUH are untrained high skilled workers, N
T
H are trained high skilled work-
ers and the total number of workers N is N = NL+NH comprising low skilled
workers NL, NL = NUL +N
T
L , and high skilled workers NH , NH = N
U
H +N
T
H .
I expect that trained workers are more productive than untrained workers
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and hence δ > 1 and ² > 1. Substituting equations (7) and (8) into (6) gives
Q = A(NUL + δN
T
L )
α(NUH + ²N
T
H)
βKγ . (9)
I can rewrite (9) as
Q=A(NL −NTL + δNTL )α(NH −NTH + ²NTH)βKγ
=A(NL + (δ − 1)NTL )α(NH + (²− 1)NTH)βKγ
=A(NL + (δ − 1)TrainLNL)α(NH + (²− 1)TrainHNH)βKγ ,
where TrainH =
NTH
NH
is the proportion of high skilled trained workers in all
high skilled workers and TrainL =
NTL
NL
is the proportion of low skilled trained
workers in all low skilled workers. Rewriting yields
Q = A(1 + (δ − 1)TrainL)α(1 + (²− 1)TrainH)βKγNαLNβH . (10)
If (δ−1)TrainL and (²−1)TrainH are small, the approximation ln(1+x) = x
can be used and the production function can be rewritten in logarithmic form
as
logQ= logA+ α log(1 + (δ − 1)TrainL) + β log(1 + (²− 1)TrainH) + γ logK
+α logNL + β logNH
= logA+ α(δ − 1)TrainL + β(²− 1)TrainH + γ logK + α logNL + β logNH .
Rewritten in per capita terms (substract logN from both sides)gives
log
Q
N
= logA+ α(δ − 1)TrainL + β(²− 1)TrainH
+γ logK + α logNL + β logNH − logN. (11)
For the case of constant returns to scale (α+ β + γ = 1),
log
Q
N
= logA+ α(δ − 1)TrainL + β(²− 1)TrainH
+γ logK + α logNL + β logNH − (α+ β + γ) logN (12)
and
log
Q
N
= logA+ α(δ − 1)TrainL + β(²− 1)TrainH
+γ log
K
N
+ α log
NL
N
+ β log
NH
N
. (13)
If trained workers are as productive as untrained workers, i.e. δ = 1 and
² = 1, then the coefficients of TrainH and TrainL will be zero.
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6.2 Empirical Results
To compare productivity effects with wage effects of training low and high
skilled workers, I again estimate wage regressions using the same specification
as in the productivity equation. I use the average wage of low and high
skilled workers separately to estimate the effect of training for low and for
high skilled workers on their own wage and on wages of the other skill group.
That way, I am able to test for differences in rent sharing between firms and
high skilled employees and firms and low skilled employees. As derived from
the theoretical considerations, I suspect that high skilled employees are able
to capture a higher share of the training rent than low skilled employees.
Also, I can find evidence whether differences in the wage mark up between
low and high skilled workers are due to differences in the productivity impact.
Alternatively, high and low skilled workers might take part in different types of
training, leading to different productivity impacts. In addition, the bargaining
power is important. Even if the productivity impact of training is similar for
both skill groups, differences in the impact on wages can arise if one skill
group has more bargaining power in capturing (part of) the training rent.
Additionally, I test whether there are externalities of continuing training be-
tween skill groups. In that case, the social return would differ from the
individual return to continuing training and might justify government inter-
vention. For example, when high skilled workers receive training, this may not
only raise their own productivity but also the productivity of low skilled and
hence increase wages for both groups. In that case, training of high skilled
workers contains a positive externality because there are positive spillovers
from training on the productivity of low skilled.
In the first column of Table 5, estimates of the influence of low and high skilled
training participation on average wages of low skilled is presented. The esti-
mated coefficients are insignificant. In contrast, lagged training participation
of high skilled increases the average of high skilled and training of low skilled
does not impact the average wage of high skilled workers (second column of
Table 5). In the third column, the impact of low and high skilled workers’
training participation on value added per worker is shown. The results sug-
gest that only training of low skilled workers has an impact on productivity,
while training of high skilled workers has no significant influence. Summing
up, it seems that training low skilled workers increases productivity and that
firms capture the gain from training since value added is increased by training
but low skilled workers do not receive a wage mark up after training. For high
skilled workers, results suggest the contrary. There seems to be also a rent
to share after training. In the case of high skilled employees participating
in training, not the firms gain from the productivity increase, but the high
skilled workers receive a wage mark up.
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Table 5: System GMM with two skill groups: Wage and productivity regres-
sions
hourly wage hourly wage productivity
low-skilled high-skilled
GMM GMM GMM
coef. z-values coef. z-values coef. z-values
TrainingL -0.01 (-0.02) -1.01 (-1.22) 2.20 (1.74)∗
TrainingL t-1 -0.37 (-0.75) -0.14 (-0.17) 1.09 (0.89)
TrainingH 0.49 (1.61) -0.29 (-0.62) -0.26 (-0.76)
TrainingH t-1 -0.15 (-0.99) 0.68 (3.45)∗∗∗ 0.03 (0.10)
Capital 0.02 (0.14) -0.10 (-0.35) 0.83 (2.03)∗∗
Capital t-1 -0.05 (-0.37) 0.08 (0.30) -0.80 (-1.95)∗
Investments -0.05 (-1.11) -0.01 (-0.18) 0.23 (4.62)∗∗∗
Investments t-1 0.07 (1.90)∗ 0.01 (0.21) -0.24 (-5.02)∗∗∗
ln hourly-wage t-1 0.65 (2.99)∗∗∗ 0.68 (2.08)∗∗ 1.01 (22.03)∗∗∗
Firmsize5 -0.33 (-3.10)∗∗∗ 0.24 (0.96) -0.47 (-1.17)
Temporary contract -0.17 (-0.69) -0.09 (-0.20) 1.13 (2.13)∗∗
Job change -0.46 (-1.49) -0.51 (-0.68) -1.77 (-1.74)∗
High skilled -1.64 (-1.69)∗ -0.23 (-0.11) -2.31 (-0.78)
Women -0.17 (-2.22)∗∗ -0.07 (-0.72) -0.01 (-0.27)
Labour 0.01 (1.71)∗ 0.00 (0.11) 0.00 (0.23)
LabourH 0.22 (1.82)∗ 0.09 (0.40) 0.15 (0.49)
LabourL -0.50 (-1.31) 0.10 (0.11) -0.95 (-0.83)
Tenure 0-4 reference reference reference
Tenure 5-9 -0.01 (-0.04) 0.12 (0.31) -0.22 (-0.68)
Tenure 10-14 0.20 (0.90) -0.42 (-0.68) -0.69 (-1.29)
Tenure 15-19 0.06 (0.20) 0.39 (0.76) 0.20 (0.42)
Tenure 20-29 -0.01 (-0.04) -0.03 (-0.06) -0.31 (-0.78)
Tenure 30-39 0.22 (0.59) -0.09 (-0.12) -1.00 (-1.46)
Tenure 40-51 1.84 (1.55) 0.38 (0.19) 3.10 (1.69)∗
Instruments ln(hoursH/N)t−2,t−3, ln(hoursL/N)t−2,t−3,
trainingHt−2,t−3, trainingLt−2,t−3 and ln(K/N)t−2,t−3
in difference equations; ∆ln(hoursH/N)t−1,
∆ln(hoursL/N)t−1, ∆trainingHt−1, ∆trainingLt−1 and
∆ln(K/N)t−1 in levels equations
Sargan/Hansen 0,999 0.992 0.992
AR(1) (p-value) 0.002 0.016 0.110
AR(2) (p-value) 0.851 0.328 0.317
Observations 208 208 208
Note: The dependent variable in the first column is the average log hourly wage for low
and high skilled in the second and third column, and value added per worker in the fourth
column. All variables are first-differenced. Results are reported for one-step system-GMM-
estimators. The robust estimator of the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates were
calculated and the resulting standard error estimates are consistent in the presence of any
pattern of heteroskedasticity. All specifications include a constant, time dummies as well
as an east-west dummy.
Estimation by “xtabond2” command in STATA/SE 8.2.
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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7 Conclusion
The analyses in this paper provide evidence for the existence of rent shar-
ing between firms and workers. On average, both employers and employees
profit from the investment in human capital since sectoral training intensity
increases both sectoral value added per worker as well as sectoral average
hourly wages. The productivity effect of training is about three times higher
than the wage effect. In addition, training has a lagged impact on productivity
but not on wage levels.
The basic model is extended to differentiate between low and high skilled
workers. The results from the analysis with two types of workers are in line
with results in Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003). High skilled workers receive a
wage mark up from participating in training while low skilled workers, on
average, experience no wage effect of training. There seems to be a positive
impact of training low skilled workers on productivity but no impact of train-
ing high skilled workers. This might be explained by the either high training
costs (which decrease value added) or, more likely, by the small number of
high skilled workers. With the data on sector level we cannot measure the
productivity increase of only one skill group but only of the whole sector.
The analysis on a sectoral level allows the estimation of external effects be-
tween workers and firms. In particular, I estimate the impact of training one
skill group on wages of the other group. The idea is that high skilled work-
ers might transmit knowledge acquired in training to low skilled workers or
they may organise work procedures more efficiently or improve production
processes after training which affects also low skilled workers. In the empir-
ical analysis with aggregated data I find no evidence for external effects of
training between skill groups.
Since the estimation of the impact of training on productivity is on a sectoral
level, it includes spillover effects between firms in the same sector. Such
spillover effects are existent if firms learn with each other, if they copy from
each other or if job changes between firms in the same sector induce human
capital to be transmitted. The impact of training on productivity estimated
here is much higher than calculated effects of training on productivity with
firm level data. Zwick (2004 and 2006), for example, finds an impact of
training on firm productivity that is only one third of the impact on sector
productivity estimated in this study. Even though both data sets used are
representative for Germany, the difference in the coefficient can be (partly)
explained by the difference in the data sets used. Nevertheless, the results
suggests that external effects of continuing training exist in Germany. This is
in line with the findings of Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000 and 2005).
The training measure used here is crude, including all types of training. I
cannot distinguish whether the training measures for high skilled are different
from training for low skilled. Given previous evidence (see Kuckulenz and
Zwick, 2005, and Kuckulenz, 2006), it is likely that the type of training differs
between skill groups. This could also explain why the impact of training varies
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between skill groups as suggested in the extension. While low skilled workers
participate often in internal and firm-specific training, high skilled workers
often take part in external training that is more general and where the new
knowledge would be useful also in other firms. This is in line with the results
in this paper: high skilled workers increase their general human capital in
training and receive a wage mark up afterwards. In contrast, low skilled
workers increase their firm specific human capital in continuing training and
do not obtain a higher wage after training participation.
The analysis here is restricted to the training impact on wages and produc-
tivity. Other important aspects are not taken into account. It may well be
that also low skilled workers profit from training participation even if they
do not receive a wage mark up. Positive effects from training on job security
and on satisfaction with the job are very likely.
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8 Appendix
Table 6: Means and standard deviations
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs
Wage (in logs) 2.90 0.17 406
Value added (in logs) -3.19 0.47 382
training 0.03 0.02 406
Capital (in logs) -3.49 0.84 364
Investments (in logs) -5.17 0.85 385
Labour (in logs) -3.51 1.05 385
Job change 0.10 0.03 406
High skilled 0.24 0.14 406
Women 0.44 0.21 406
East 0.03 0.01 406
Tenure 0-4 0.35 0.09 406
Tenure 5-9 0.22 0.04 406
Tenure 10-14 0.13 0.03 406
Tenure 15-19 0.08 0.02 406
Tenure 20-29 0.13 0.05 406
Tenure 30-39 0.05 0.02 406
Tenure 40-51 0.01 0.01 406
Age 17-20 0.01 0.01 406
Age 21-25 0.07 0.02 406
Age 26-30 0.12 0.02 406
Age 31-35 0.15 0.02 406
Age 36-40 0.16 0.02 406
Age 41-50 0.27 0.03 406
Age 51-65 0.22 0.04 406
Table 7: Training intensity by economic sector
Sector Training
(in percent)
Education and teaching 0.07
Activities connected with banking and insurance industry 0.06
Health care, veterinary medicine and welfare 0.06
Insurance industry 0.06
Banking sector 0.06
Lobbies, churchly and other religious unions 0.05
Data handling and databases 0.05
Manufacture of office machines and data handling equipment 0.05
Civil service, defence, social insurance 0.05
Research and development 0.04
to be continued...
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...table 7 continued
Sector Training
(in percent)
Aviation 0.04
Energy supply 0.04
Coking plant and petroleum processing 0.03
Chemical industry 0.03
Water supply 0.03
Broadcast, television and communications engineering 0.03
Services mainly for establishments 0.03
Manufacture of electricity production and allocation equip-
ment
0.03
Premises and housing 0.03
Telecommunications 0.03
Culture, sport and entertainment 0.03
Manufacture of automobiles and automobile particles 0.03
Other vehicle construction 0.03
Medical technology, measurement, control technology, optics 0.02
Other services 0.02
Extraterritorial organisations and statutory corporations 0.02
Engineering 0.02
Extraction of crude oil and natural gasoline and with it con-
nected services
0.02
Forestry 0.02
Automobile trade, maintenance and mending of automobiles,
petrol station
0.02
Tobacco processing 0.02
Land transport, transport via pipelines 0.02
Metal production and machining 0.02
Commerce intermediation and whole sale 0.02
Publisher and print trade, duplication of played 0.02
Sound storage medium, picture carrier and record carrier
Waste, sewage and other disposal 0.02
Coal mining, extraction of turf 0.02
Auxiliary activities and additional businesses for traffic, traf-
fic intermediation
0.02
Manufacture of vulcanised rubber and plastic goods 0.02
Retail, mending 0.02
Manufacture of metal manufactures 0.02
Glass trade, ceramics, processing of stones and earthen 0.02
Paper trade 0.01
Construction 0.01
Wood trade 0.01
Textile processing 0.01
to be continued...
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...table 7 continued
Sector Training
(in percent)
Extraction of stones and earthen, other mining 0.01
Navy 0.01
Agriculture and hunting 0.01
Clothing trade 0.01
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, musical instruments, 0.01
pieces of sports equipment and other manufactures
Renting of chattels without operating staff 0.01
Hotel and restaurant industry 0.01
Nutrition trade 0.01
Recycling 0.01
Private households 0.01
Leather trade 0.01
Fishery and fish farming 0.00
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